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Preferred Stock Recapitalizations: A Basic Look at
Some Tax Problems
William Y Rodewald*
Carl A. Cohen**
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to transfer the economic benefits of future growth in a
closely held corporation, a recapitalization is often suggested in
which the older shareholders exchange most or all of their common
stock for newly issued preferred stock, leaving the growth potential,
represented by common stock, largely or exclusively in the younger
shareholders.
There are several advantages to such a recapitalization. If the
corporation can afford to make the payments, the preferred stock
will provide a steady source of income to the older shareholders. For
income tax purposes, a recapitalization, which can be defined as the
reshuffling of the capital structure of an existing corporation,' can
be structured as a "tax-free" reorganization under the Internal Rev-
enue Code.2 Gift tax consequences can be minimized by taking
pains to insure that the value of the preferred stock (or preferred and
common stock) received in the exchange is generally equivalent to
the value of the common stock surrendered.3 Finally, for estate tax
purposes, any future appreciation in the value of the corporate stock
will inure to the common stock held by the younger shareholders,
not the preferred stock held by the older shareholders. The result is
* LL.B., Harvard Law School; Partner, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle & Buerger,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
** J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law; Associate, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rode-
wald, Kyle & Buerger, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 202 (1942).
2. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(E). All section references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, as amended.
3. If the preferred stock received has a value greater or less than the value of the common
stock surrendered, the difference "will be treated as having been used to make gifts, pay
compensation, satisfy obligations of any kind, or for whatever purpose the facts indicate."
Rev. Rul. 74-269, 1974-1 C.B. 87. For instance, if the value of the common stock surrendered
exceeds the value of the preferred stock received, the excess could be treated as a taxable
gift by the recipient of the preferred stock to the other shareholders. I.R.C. §§ 2511(a),
2512(b).
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that the value of the older shareholders' interest in the corporation
is "fixed" as of the time of the recapitalization exchange, thereby
saving the estate tax which would otherwise be paid on any future
appreciation of common stock retained by the older shareholders
until their death.
Several potential disadvantages do exist, however, and it is the
purpose of this article to consider them. The problems arise from the
application of sections 306 and 305 of the Internal Revenue Code.
II. TAX PROBLEMS ARISING FROM SECTION 306
If the preferred stock issued in a recapitalization is "section 306
stock,"' disposition of that stock during the lifetime of the older
shareholders will have serious adverse tax consequences.5 Moreover,
unless certain provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (now held
in abeyance until 1980) are changed, this "section 306 taint" will
continue to exist even after the death of the older shareholders.
A. The Purpose and Effect of Section 306
Congress enacted section 306 in order to eliminate what used to
be an accepted technique for transforming ordinary income into
capital gain, known as the "preferred stock bailout." The technique
operated in the following manner. A corporation with only common
stock outstanding would issue a nontaxable preferred stock divi-
dend on the common stock. The shareholders would then sell the
preferred stock to a third party, reporting the gain as capital gain.
To complete the transaction, the corporation would redeem the pre-
ferred stock from the third party at a premium (the incentive for the
third party to participate). This procedure enabled the shareholders
to "bail out" corporate earnings and profits at capital gains rates
without changing the proportionate interests of the shareholders. If
a cash dividend had been paid to them in lieu of the preferred stock,
they would have had ordinary income to the extent of the corpora-
tion's earnings and profits.7
Section 306 halts the use of the preferred stock bailout by defining
4. The definition of section 306 stock is found in I.R.C. § 306(c). See discussion in text
accompanying notes 13-25 infra.
5. See discussion in text accompanying notes 7-9 infra.
6. See discussion in text accompanying notes 10-12 infra.
7. I.R.C. §§ 316(a), 301(c)(1).
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section 306 stock so as to apply to preferred stock issued in bailout
types of situations,' and by directing that the sale or other disposi-
tion of section 306 stock generally gives rise to ordinary income
rather than capital gain.9 Thus, the receipt of section 306 stock does
not produce an immediate tax; it is the subsequent disposition upon
which a heavy tax is imposed. Hence, section 306 stock is said to
be tainted due to the adverse tax consequences attached to it.
B. The Application of Section 306 to Recapitalizations
One of the major disadvantages involved in issuing preferred
stock in a recapitalization is the possibility that it may be consid-
ered to be section 306 stock. As such, its sale or other disposition
would produce ordinary income rather than capital gain. Prior to
the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the problem of section 306 stock could
be minimized by having the older shareholder hold the preferred
stock until his death, at which time the preferred stock received a
new basis 0 and thereby lost its taint. " However, under the carryover
basis provisions of the 1976 Act, effective January 1, 1980, death
would no longer "launder" section 306 stock.'2 It is impossible to
predict with any confidence how Congress will ultimately decide to
deal either with carryover basis or its effect on section 306 stock.
Accordingly, it has become very important to determine whether
preferred stock issued in recapitalizations will be characterized as
section 306 stock, and to avoid that characterization if at all possi-
ble.
8. See note 4 supra.
9. I.R.C. § 306(a).
10. I.R.C. § 1014(a).
11. I.R.C. § 306(c)(1)(C) states:
(C) STOCK HAVING TRANSFERRED OR SuBsTrrUED BAss.-Except as otherwise pro-
vided in subparagraph (B), stock the basis of which (in the hands of the shareholder
selling or otherwise disposing of such stock) is determined by reference to the basis (in
the hands of such shareholder or any other person) of section 306 stock.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the basis of preferred stock in the hands of younger
shareholders was determined by reference to the value at the date of death of older sharehold-
ers from whom the preferred was obtained, not by reference to its basis in the hands of older
shareholders (in whose hands the preferred was § 306 stock).
12. Under the carryover basis provisions, the basis of the preferred would be determined
by reference to its basis in the hands of the older shareholder.
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C. Is the Preferred Stock Received in Recapitalizations Section
306 Stock?
Section 306 stock can be created in three ways, of which only one
is here applicable. Section 306(c)(1)(B) sets out four general condi-
tions, all of which must be satisfied in order for the preferred stock
to be characterized as section 306 stock:
(1) The stock is not common stock;
(2) It was received by the shareholder in a section 368(a) re-
organization;
(3) Gain or loss was not recognized on its receipt;
(4) The effect of the transaction was substantially the same
as the receipt of a stock dividend.
In the type of recapitalization with which we are here concerned, the
first three conditions are satisfied. The difficult question is whether
the fourth condition is satisfied. As to whether "the effect of the
transaction is substantially the same as the receipt of a stock divi-
dend," the Regulations state:
Ordinarily, section 306 stock includes stock which is not com-
mon stock received in pursuance of a plan of reorganization
(within the meaning of section 368(a)) or received in a distribu-
tion or exchange to which section 355 (or so much of section 356
as relates to section 355) applies if cash received in lieu of such
stock would have been treated as a dividend under section
356(a)(2) or would have been treated as a distribution to which
section 301 applies by virtue of section 356(b) or section
302(d). 13
Since section 356(b) is inapplicable to recapitalizations, the "cash
substitution" test is satisfied only if cash received in lieu of pre-
ferred stock would have been treated as a dividend under section
356(a)(2) or as a distribution to which section 301 applies by virtue
of section 302(d).
1. The Cash Substitution Test: Section 356(a)(2)
Section 356 governs the treatment of boot received in corporate
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3(d) (emphasis added).
All Regulation references herein are to the Regulations under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, as amended.
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reorganizations. Section 356(a)(1) provides that gain which would
otherwise not be recognized in a reorganization exchange shall be
recognized to the extent of any boot received. Section 356(a)(2)
provides that the gain recognized under section 356(a)(1) shall be
ordinary income rather than capital gain if the exchange has the
effect of the distribution of a dividend. 1
The reference in the Regulation to section 356(a)(2) does not seem
to advance the analysis: cash "would have been treated as a divi-
dend" under Regulation 1.306-3(d) if it "has the effect of the distri-
bution of a dividend" under section 356(a)(2). The meaning of the
latter Code language, however, has had a long and involved history.
For several decades following Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford,5
almost everyone assumed that if a continuing shareholder recog-
nized a gain under section 356 or its predecessor, the gain would
automatically be treated as a dividend to the extent of the corpora-
tion's accumulated earnings and profits. After losing a number of
cases," however, the Internal Revenue Service abandoned this
"automatic dividend" position in 1974.1 The test of dividend equiv-
alence has apparently, by default, become about the same for sec-
tion 356 (boot) as it is for section 302 (redemptions). 8 This imported
redemption test presumably includes the requirement that any non-
dividend redemption must result in a "meaningful reduction" of the
taxpayer's proportionate interest in the corporation."
14. Section 356(a) states:
(a) GAIN ON EXCHANGES.-
(1) Recognition of Gain.-If-
(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the fact that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of property per-
mited by section 354 or 355 to be received without the recognition of gain but
also of other property or money,
then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized,but in an amount not in excess
of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property.
(2) TREATMENT As DIWDEND-If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has
the effect of the distribution of a dividend, then there shall be treated as a dividend
to each distributees such an amount of the gain recognized under paragraph (1) as is
not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of the
corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain
recognized under paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property.
15. 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
16. The final downfall of the "automatic dividend" rule came in Wright v. United States,
482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973).
17. Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121.
18. 482 F.2d at 605.
19. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
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Since the test for dividend equivalence under section 356 is ap-
proximately the same as the test under section 302 (and may be
even more favorable to taxpayers because section 356 does not call
for the application of the constructive ownership rules of section
318(a)), and since Regulation 1.306-3(d) directly refers to section
302, it seems reasonably clear that the older shareholders in the type
of recapitalization now under consideration have little to fear from
the Regulation's reference to section 356.
It is important to note, however, that if the older shareholders
keep or get some common stock as well as preferred stock, the ques-
tion of dividend equivalence under section 356 becomes more of a
"judgment call," especially since views distressingly reminiscent of
the old automatic dividend rule are still occasionally expressed. 0
2. The Cash Substitution Test: Section 302(d)
The other cash substitution test for dividend equivalence referred
to by Regulation 1.306-3(d) is section 302. As was suggested pre-
viously, the section 356 test for dividend equivalence is now by
default probably about the same as the section 302 test, which ac-
cordingly achieves a double significance.
Section 302(a) provides that a redemption of stock will be treated
as an exchange, and not as a dividend, if the redemption falls into
one of several "safe harbor" provisions listed in section 302(b). If a
redemption does not fall within one of the safe harbor provisions,
section 302(d) provides that the redemption will be subject to the
normal dividend rules of section 301.
The safe harbor provisions of section 302(b) provide that a re-
demption will not be treated as a dividend (and hence the preferred
stock will not be section 306 stock) if the redemption is not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend; if the distribution is substantially
20. Shimberg v. United States, 577 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1978). Shimberg involved the
determination of whether boot received in an (A) reorganization should be granted exchange
treatment under § 356(a)(1) or be taxed as a dividend under § 356(a)(2). The Court found
that the boot was taxable as a dividend. The Court reached this conclusion without stating
the reasons for doing so. Although the Court stated that its decision did "not signal a return
to the now discarded automatic dividend rule"; id. at 290; the lack of rationale supporting
its decision is bothersome because it is reminiscent of the automatic dividend approach.
However, the Court also stated that it did not "reject the relevance of principles developed
in § 302 redemption cases" in situations where the transaction in question can be likened to
a redemption (such as a recapitalization). Id. As such, Shimberg probably does not change
the test under § 356(a)(2) in recapitalization cases. Section 302 principles should still apply.
Vol. 17: 3-4
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disproportionate with respect to the shareholder; or if the redemp-
tion is in complete redemption of all the stock of the corporation
owned by the shareholder.
On the facts of the recapitalization with which we are here con-
cerned, the bare language of section 302(b) 21 appears to make it
quite clear that the "redemption" of the older shareholders' com-
mon stock, if it had been for cash, would not have been taxable as
a dividend, and that accordingly the preferred should not be treated
as section 306 stock. At least if the older shareholders do not keep
or receive any common stock, the transaction would result in a
"meaningful reduction" in their proportionate interest in the corpo-
ration and hence would satisfy the Davis test2 as to dividend equiv-
alence. It would also be substantially disproportionate and consti-
21. I.R.C. § 302(b) states in part:
(b) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS EXCHANGES.-
(1) REDEMPTIONS NOT EQUIVALENT TO DIVIDENDS.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the
redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
(2) SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE REDEMPTION OF STOCK.-
(A) IN GENERAL. -Subsection (a) shall not apply if the distribution is sub-
stantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(B) LiMrFATION.-This paragraph shall not apply unless immediately after
the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
(C) DEINrrONS.-For purposes of this paragraph, the distribution is sub-
stantially disproportionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the
shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to all of the voting
stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of-
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the
shareholder immediately before the redemption bears to all of the voting
stock of the corporation at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as substantially
disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of the common stock of the
corporation (whether voting or nonvoting) after and before redemption also
meets the 80 percent requirement of the preceding sentence. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, if there is more than one class of common stock, the deter-
minations shall be made by reference to fair market value.
(D) SERIES OF REDEMPTIONS. -This paragraph shall not apply to any redemp-
tion made pursuant to a plan the purpose or effect of which is a series of
redemptions resulting in a distribution which (in the aggregate) is not substan-
tially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(3) TERMINATION OF SHAREHOLDER'S INTEREST.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the
redemption is in complete redemption of all of the stock of the corporation owned by
the shareholder.
22. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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tute a complete termination of their interest under the other two
safe harbor provisions.
Unfortunately, however, section 302(b) might not be the only pro-
vision of section 302 involved in this analysis. Section 302(c) pro-
vides that, in determining ownership of stock for purposes of section
302, it is necessary to apply the constructive ownership rules of
section 318(a). Under these constructive ownership rules, if, for ex-
ample, a family owns most of the stock of a corporation, and the
father's stock is redeemed, the father is still treated after the re-
demption as being the owner of the stock held by the remainder of
his family. As such, the redemption would not result in a meaning-
ful reduction of his interest in the corporation, would not be sub-
stantially disproportionate as to him, and would not be a complete
termination of his interest. Therefore, the redemption would be
treated as a dividend.
These constructive ownership rules pose a serious threat to the
type of recapitalization under consideration. The cash substitution
test of Regulation 1.306-3(d) provides that, if cash received in lieu
of the preferred would be treated as a dividend, then the preferred
is section 306 stock. If in making this determination under section
302 the constructive ownership rules of section 318(a) apply as a
result of section 302(c), the cash hypothetically received by older
shareholders of a family owned corporation would not result in a
meaningful reduction of their interest, would not be substantially
disproportionate as to them, and would not be a complete termina-
tion of their interest under section 302(b). As such, the cash hypo-
thetically received would be treated as a dividend, and the preferred
stock actually received by them would be section 306 stock. It is
therefore very important to determine whether these constructive
ownership rules apply to the Regulation's cash substitution test for
defining section 306 stock.
3. Do the Section 318(a) Constructive Ownership Rules Apply to
the Definition of Section 306 Stock?
Section 318(a) specifically provides that the constructive owner-
ship rules will apply only to those provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code "to which the rules contained in this section are expressly
made applicable." Section 318(b) then refers to "section
306(b)(1)(A) (relating to disposition of section 306 stock)." Section
306(b) (1) (A) does indeed refer to section 318, but only in connection
Vol. 17: 3-4
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with a special exception dealing with certain dispositions of section
306 stock to unrelated persons. Section 318 is nowhere "expressly
made applicable" to section 306(c), which defines section 306 stock.
We are here concerned with the definition of section 306 stock, not
the sale of it to a stranger.
Regulation 1.306-3(d) in setting up the cash substitution test for
determining whether preferred is section 306 stock does refer to cash
which, if received in lieu of such stock, would have been treated as
a dividend under section 356(a)(2) or 302(d). Hence, to the extent
that the section 318(a) constructive ownership rules apply to those
Code sections, it may be argued that they apply to the Regulation.
If the Regulation draws a general analogy to another section of the
Code, it refers to the whole section and not just to certain unspeci-
fied bits and pieces of that section. The short answer to this argu-
ment for applying the section 318(a) constructive ownership rules to
section 306 is that they are not "expressly made applicable," and
the Regulations cannot add a provision which has been deliberately
omitted from section 306 of the Code by analogizing to a different
Code section which does incorporate that particular provision.
Nor can it be effectively argued that the constructive ownership
rules should apply in order to maintain logical consistency of treat-
ment within the Code. Regulation 1.306-3(d) refers to the dividend
equivalence rules of sections 356 and 302. The constructive owner-
ship rules clearly apply to section 30 2 2 and almost as clearly do not
apply to section 356.2' Thus, the question is not whether to be con-
sistent with the rest of the Code, but rather, which part of the Code
to be consistent with. On the whole, the better view is that the
constructive ownership rules should not apply, and that the pre-
ferred stock received by older shareholders in the recapitalization
(at least if older shareholders do not retain or receive any common
stock) should not be section 306 stock.
The Internal Revenue Service apparently agrees. Recent private
letter rulings, at least, appear to be based on that assumption.2 5 It
23. I.R.C. § 302(c).
24. They are not "expressly made applicable". Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118, 119;
but cf. Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1973) and theodissent therein.
25. See, e.g., Letter Ruling No. 7907032 (November 15, 1978), in which a corporation has
160 shares of common stock outstanding. A owns 13 shares and the remaining 147 shares are
owned equally by A's seven sons. Pursuant to a plan of recapitalization, A is to exchange all
of his common stock for newly issued preferred stock. The seven sons are not to participate
1978-79
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is, however, very dangerous to assume that this is or will remain the
law. No published case or ruling has clearly reached the result or
employed the reasoning set forth above. And reliance on private
letter rulings is hazardous at best, in view of the fact that both
section 6110(j)(3) and a legend stamped onto each ruling clearly
warn that the rulings "may not be used or cited as precedent."
D. Conclusion
In view of the uncertainty of the law and the apparent willingness
of the Service to issue favorable private letter rulings, it seems clear
that a ruling should be obtained if at all possible, to the effect that
the preferred will not be section 306 stock, before taxpayers enter
into a recapitalization of the type here under discussion. Currently
rulings of this type can be obtained within about three months of
the application. If for any reason a ruling cannot be obtained, the
older shareholders should exchange all of their old common stock
and thereafter hold only preferred stock and no common stock.
III. TAX PROBLEMS ARISING FROM SECTION 305
A. Problems Arising at the Time of the Recapitalization -
Sections 305(b)(3) and 305(c)
Section 305 deals with the taxation of stock dividends and pro-
vides that they are not taxable except as otherwise provided in
sections 305(b) and (c). The "dividend" important here is based on
the provisions of section 305(b)(3), making taxable:
(3) DISTRIBUTIONS OF COMMON AND PREFERRED STOCK - If
the distribution (or a series of distributions of which such dis-
tribution is one) has the result of -
(A) the receipt of preferred stock by some common share-
holders, and
(B) the receipt of common stock by other common share-
holders.
In a recapitalization in which older shareholders receive preferred
a
in the exchange. The ruling holds that the preferred stock will not be § 306 stock.
The private rulings do not give any rationale for this result, but it seems reasonably clear
that the Service is not applying the constructive ownership rules in determining whether cash
paid in lieu of stock would be taxed as a dividend, and hence in determining whether the
preferred is § 306 stock.
Vol. 17: 3-4
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stock, condition (A) is satisfied. Where younger shareholders do not
receive common stock, however, condition (B) is not satisfied and
section 305(b)(3) appears to have been avoided.
Section 305(c) (the "deemed distribution" provision), however,
operates to treat certain transactions as distributions to sharehold-
ers upon whom the transaction has the requisite effect, despite the
fact that no actual distribution to them takes place. 2 All that sec-
tion 305(c) by its terms requires is that the transaction have the
effect of increasing the proportionate interest of the shareholders
who are "deemed" to have received a distribution. In the type of
recapitalization under discussion here, section 305(c) would appear
to "deem" younger shareholders to be in receipt of common stock
(because their proportionate interest is increased by the recapital-
ization) despite the fact that no common stock was actually distrib-
uted to them; condition (B) of section 305(b)(3) would thereby be
satisfied, and taxability would ensue. 27
Despite the result which might be reached by a literal reading of
the Code, there is evidence from a discussion on the floor of the
Senate, when these provisions were being enacted in 1969, that Con-
gress did not intend distributions of stock in such recapitalizations
to result in tax.2 The Regulations prescribed pursuant to the direc-
26. I.R.C. § 305(c) provides:
(C) CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS TREATED AS DIsTmunoNs-For purposes of this section
and section 301, the Secretary shall prescribe regulations under which a change in
conversion ratio, a change in redemption price, a difference between redemption price
and issue price, a redemption which is treated as a distribution to which section 301
applies, or any transaction (including a recapitalization) having a similar effect on the
interest of any shareholder shall be treated as a distribution with respect to any
shareholder whose proportionate interest in the earnings and profits or assets of the
corporation is increased by such change, difference, redemption, or similar transaction.
27. Taxability would also ensue under § 305(b)(2), which states:
(2) DISPROPORTIONATE DISTmIBUTIONS.-If the distribution (or a series of distribu-
tions of which such distribution is one) has the result of-
(A) the receipt of property by some shareholders, and
(B) an increase in the proportionate interests of other shareholders in the
assets or earnings and profits of the corporation.
The discussion of taxability under § 305(b)(3) also applies to § 305(b)(2).
28. 115 CONG. REc. 37,902 (1969) contains the following colloquy:
Mr. AIKEN. At this point, Mr. President, I would like to ask the chairman of the
Committee on Finance a question for the purpose of clarifying one section of the bill.
I notice that the bill - page 297, section 421 - taxes dividends in stock in all cases
where there are two classes of stock outstanding and there are different distributions
with regard to these two classes such as stock on one class and cash on the other class
or preferred stock on one class and common stock on the other class.
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tion in section 305(c) support this contention. Regulation 1.305-7(c)
provides in part:
(c) Recapitalizations. (1) A recapitalization (whether or not
an isolated transaction) will be deemed to result in a distribu-
tion to which section 305(c) and this section apply if -
(i) It is pursuant to a plan to periodically increase a share-
holder's proportionate interest in the assets or earnings and
profits of the corporation, or
(ii) A shareholder owning preferred stock with dividends in
arrears exchanges his stock for other stock and, as a result,
increases his proportionate interest in the assets or earnings
and profits of the corportion. An increase in a preferred share-
holder's proportionate interest occurs in any case where the fair
market value or the liquidation preference, whichever is
greater, of the stock received in the exchange (determined
immediately following the recapitalization), exceeds the issue
price of the preferred stock surrendered.
Revenue Ruling 75-9319 confirms the implication of the Regulation
that a recapitalization will result in a "deemed" distribution only
if it is "pursuant to a plan to periodically increase a shareholder's
proportionate interest" or if it involves preferred stock with divi-
dends in arrears. Example 12 of Regulation 1.305-3(e) further con-
firms the view of the Service as to the non-applicability of section
305 to recapitalizations of the type with which we are here con-
cerned. 0
However, I note that the bill also provides that under certain conditions a recapitali-
zation may be treated as a distribution of stock or property. It is my understanding
that there is no intention to alter the status of a recapitalization in which, for example,
the older stockholders exchange some or all of their common stock for preferred stock
and retire from the business while the younger stockholders exchange some or all of
their preferred stock for additional common stock and continue to be active in the
business. This has been a classic type of recapitalization which has always been consid-
ered tax free in the past. Am I correct in that there is no intention to change the status
of a recapitalizaiton of this type with a bona fide business purpose?
Mr. LONG. The Senator is correct. There is no intention to impose a tax on a bona
fide recapitalization of this type, except to the extent stock is given in payment for
dividend arrearages on the preferred stock.
29. 1975-1 C.B. 101.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(e) (example 12):
Corporation R has 2,000 shares of class A stock outstanding. Five shareholders own
300 shares each and five shareholders own 100 shares each. In preparation for the
retirement of the five major shareholders, corporation R, in a single and isolated
Vol. 17: 3-4
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Finally, in numerous private letter rulings of the type referred to
in Part II of this article, in which the Service held that preferred
stock was not Section 306 stock, the Service also held that the ex-
change of common for preferred would not be treated as a distri-
bution to which section 301 applies by reason of section 305(b) or
(c). In one typical private letter ruling, 3' the Service held that the
exchange of A's common stock for the newly issued preferred stock
would "not be treated as a distribution to which section 301 of the
Code applies by reason of the application of section 305(b) and (c),
provided that this transaction is isolated and not part of a plan to
periodically increase a shareholder's proportionate interest in the
assets or earnings and profits of the corporation."
Despite the present view of the Service, as rather clearly ex-
pressed in the Regulations, Revenue Ruling 75-93, and private
letter rulings, the Code itself remains a threat. Since each case
must be decided on its own facts, and since it is likely that a ruling
will be sought in any event on the section 306 stock issue, it again
seems quite desirable to seek a ruling that the recapitalization will
not give rise to a dividend.
B. Problems Arising Subsequent to the Recapitalization -
Sections 305(b)(4) and 305(c)
Another exception to the general (non-dividend) rule of section
305(a) is section 305(b)(4), making taxable:
(4) DImTRmUTIONS ON PREFERRED STOCK - If the distribution
is with respect to preferred stock, other than an increase in the
conversion ratio of convertible preferred stock made solely to
take account of a stock dividend or stock split with respect to
the stock into which such convertible stock is convertible.
Before any but the most common and unimaginative provisions
are included in the preferred stock distributed to older share-
transaction, has a recapitalization in which each share of class A stock may be ex-
changed either for five shares of new class B nonconvertible preferred stock plus 0.4
share of new class C common stock, or for two shares of new class C common stock.
As a result of the exchanges, each of the five major shareholders receives 1,500 shares
of class B nonconvertible preferred stock and 120 shares of class C common stock. The
remaining shareholders each receive 200 shares of class C common stock. None of the
exchanges are within the purview of section 305.
31. Letter Ruling 790732, discussed in note 25 supra.
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holders in a recapitalization, section 305 and especially section
305(b)(4) must be carefully considered.
For example, where a redemption price in excess of a reasona-
ble call premium exists with respect to a class of preferred stock
and the other requirements of this section are also met, the
distribution will be deemed made with respect to such pre-
ferred stock, in stock of the same class. Accordingly, the pre-
ferred shareholders are considered under sections 305(b) (4) and
305(c) to have received a distribution of preferred stock to
which section 301 applies.31
Somewhat more detailed guidance is provided by Regulation 1.305-
5(b) .33
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It now seems clearly possible to have a tax-free recapitalization
in which older shareholders get preferred stock which will not be
section 306 stock and younger shareholders retain their common
stock without dividend treatment. Because of several unavoidable
ambiguities, and because of the severely undesirable effects if the
recapitalization results in (1) section 306 stock or (2) dividend
treatment or (3) subsequent unexpected difficulties, great care
should be exercised in composing the terms of the recapitalization,
and a private letter ruling from the Service as to the tax conse-
quences of the recapitalization is strongly recommended.
32. Tress. Reg. § 1.305-7(a).
33. Redemption premium. (1) If a corporation issues preferred stock which may be
redeemed after a specified period of time at a price higher than the issue price, the
difference will be considered under the authority of section 305(c) to be a distribution
of additional stock on preferred stock which is constructively received by the share-
holder over the period of time during which the preferred stock cannot be called for
redemption.
(2) Subparagraph (1) of this paragraph shall not apply to the extent that the
difference between issue price and redemption price is a reasonable redemption prem-
ium. A redemption premium will be considered reasonable if it is in the nature of a
penalty for a premature redemption of the preferred stock and if such premium does
not exceed the amount the corporation would be required to pay for the right to make
such premature redemption under market conditions existing at the time of issuance.
Such an amount can be established by comparing call premium rates on comparable
stock paying comparable dividends. However, for purposes of this subparagraph, a
redemption premium not in excess of 10 percent of the issue price on stock which is
not redeemable for 5 years from the date of issue shall be considered reasonable.
Treas. Reg. § 1.305-5(b).
